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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The theory of income taxation has been an important area of study in eco-
nomics. Interest in a formal theory of income taxation dates back to at least
J.S. Mill (1848), who advocated an equal sacrice approach to the normative
treatment of income taxes. In terms of the modern development, Musgrave
(1959) argued that two basic approaches to taxation can be distinguished: the
benet approach, which puts taxation in a Pareto e¢ciency context; and the
ability to pay approach, which puts taxation in an equity context. Some of
the early literature, such as Lindahl (1919) and Samuelson (1954, 1955), made
seminal contributions toward understanding the benet approach to taxation
and tax systems that lead to Pareto optimal allocations. Although the im-
portance of the problems posed by incentives and preference revelation were
recognized, scant attention was paid to solving them, perhaps due to their
complexity and di¢culty.
Since the inuential work of Mirrlees (1971), economists have been quite
concerned with incentives in the framework of income taxation. The model
proposed there postulates a government that tries to collect a given amount
of revenue from the economy. For example, the level of public good provi-
sion might be xed. Consumers have identical utility functions dened over
consumption and leisure, but di¤ering abilities or wage rates. The govern-
ment chooses an income tax schedule that maximizes some objective, such as
a utilitarian social welfare function, subject to collecting the needed revenue,
resource constraints, and incentive constraints based on the knowledge of only
the overall distribution of wages or abilities. The incentive constraints derive
from the notion that individuals wage levels or characteristics (such as pro-
ductivity) are unknown to the government. The optimal income tax schedule
must separate individuals as well as maximize welfare and therefore is gener-
ally second best.1 The necessary conditions for welfare optimization generally
include a zero marginal tax rate for the highest wage individual. Intuitive and
algebraic derivations of this result can be found in Seade (1977), where it is
also shown that some of these necessary conditions hold for Pareto optima as
well as utilitarian optima. Existence of an optimal tax schedule for a modied
1If the government knew the type of each agent, it could impose a di¤erential head tax.
As is common in the incentives literature, one must impose a tax that accomplishes a goal
without the knowledge of the identity of each agent ex ante.
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model was demonstrated in Kaneko (1981), and then for the classical model
in Berliant and Page (2001, 2006). An alternative view of optimal income tax-
ation is as follows. Head taxes or lump sum taxes are rst best, since public
goods are not explicit in the model and therefore Lindahl taxes cannot be used.
Second best are commodity taxes, such as Ramsey taxes. Third best are in-
come taxes, which are equivalent to a uniform marginal tax on all commodities
(or expenditure). In our view, it is not unreasonable to examine these third
best taxes, since from a pragmatic viewpoint, the rst and second best taxes
are infeasible.
1.2 A Positive Political Model
How can we explain (or model) the income tax systems we observe in the
real political world? We shall attempt to answer this question with a voting
model, a positive political model, in combination with the standard income
tax model described above. As noted in the introduction of Roberts (1977),
one does not need to believe that choices are made through any particular
voting mechanism; one need only be interested in whether choices mirror the
outcomes of some voting process. Thus, what is described below is an attempt
to construct a potentially predictive model with both political and economic
content. It contains elements of the optimal income tax literature as well as
positive political theory (an excellent survey of which can be found in Calvert
(1986)).
Although much of the optimal income tax literature and most of the work
cited above deals with the normative prescriptions of an optimal income tax,
there is a relatively small literature on voting over income taxes. Most of
this literature is either restricted to consideration of only linear taxes, or does
not consider problems due to information (adverse selection and moral haz-
ard), or both. Examples that might t primarily into the linear tax category
which also involve no labor disincentives on the part of agents are Foley (1967),
Nakayama (1976) and Guesnerie and Oddou (1981). Aumann and Kurz (1977)
use personalized lump sum taxes in a one commodity model. Hettich and
Winer (1988) present an interesting politico-economic model in which candi-
dates seek to maximize their political support by proposing nonlinear taxes.
Work disincentives are not present in the model. Chen (2000) extends their
work to the more standard optimal income tax model in the context of proba-
bilistic voting. Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), Peck (1986), and Meltzer and
Richard (1981, 1983) use linear taxes in voting models with work disincentives.
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Roemer (1999) restricts to quadratic tax functions with no work disincentives
but with political parties. Perhaps the model closest in spirit to the one we
propose below is in Snyder and Kramer (1988), which uses a modication of
the standard (nonlinear) income tax model with a linear utility function. The
modication accounts for an untaxed sector, which actually is a focus of their
paper. This interesting and stimulating paper considers fairness and progres-
sivity issues, as well as the existence of a majority equilibrium when individual
preferences are single peaked over the set of individually optimal tax schedules.
(Su¢cient conditions for single peakedness are found.) Röell (1996) considers
the di¤erences between individually optimal (or dictatorial) tax schemes and
social welfare maximizing tax schemes when there are nitely many types of
consumers. Of particular interest are the tax schedules that are individually
optimal for the median voter type. This interesting work uses quasi-linear
utility and restricts voting to tax schedules that are optimal for some type.
Brett and Weymark (2017) push this further in a continuum of types model
by characterizing individually optimal tax schedules. Then they show, un-
der conditions including quasi-linear utility, that if the set of tax schedules is
restricted to individually optimal ones, the individually optimal tax for the
median voter is a Condorcet winner.
We propose in this paper to allow general nonlinear income taxes with
work disincentives in a voting model. The main problem encountered in
trying to nd a majority equilibrium, as well as the reason that various sets
of restrictive assumptions are used to obtain such a solution in the literature,
is as follows. The set of tax schedules that are under consideration as feasible
for the economy (under any natural voting rule) is large in both number and
dimension. Thus, the voting literature such as Plott (1967) or Schoeld (1978)
tells us that it is highly unlikely that a majority rule winner will exist. Is
there a natural reduction of the number of feasible alternatives in the context
of income taxation?
1.3 The Role of Uncertainty and Feasibility
The answer appears to be yes. The (optimal) income tax model has a natural
uncertainty structure that has yet to be exploited in the voting context. As in
the classical optimal income tax model, all worker/consumers have the same
well-behaved utility function, but there is a nonatomic distribution of wages
or abilities. In standard models, such as the Mirrlees model or its modern
descendants, the distribution of consumers by type is known by all and the
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aggregate revenue requirement is xed at a scalar; it is 0 in models of pure re-
distribution. (This applies whether the number of consumer/workers is nite
or a continuum.) Suppose that a nite sample is drawn from this nonatomic
distribution.2 The nite sample will be the true economy, and the revenue
requirement imposed by the government can depend on the draw. In fact
this dependence is just a natural extension of the standard optimal income
tax model. In that model, the amount of revenue to be raised (the revenue
requirement in our terminology) is a xed parameter, something that makes
perfect sense since the population in the economy and the distribution of the
characteristics of that population are both xed, and thus we can take public
expenditures also as xed. But consider now the optimal tax problem for the
cases when the characteristics of the actual population are unknown. That is
exactly what happens when we consider that the true population is a nite
draw from a given distribution. In such circumstances, it is not reasonable to
x the revenue requirement at some exogenously given target level, but instead
the revenue requirement should be a function of the population characteris-
tics. It is possible to take derive the aggregate revenue requirement from
primitives in di¤erent ways. In our analysis below, the revenue requirements
for a particular draw will be derived from the Pareto e¢cient level of public
good provision for that draw, leading to intrinsic variation in revenue require-
ments across draws.3 We shall make assumptions on primitives implying that
the Pareto e¢cient level of public good is unique but generally di¤erent for
each draw.
Why do we focus on the Pareto e¢cient level for a given draw? Given
utility functions that are separable in the public good, ex post recontracting
on the level of public goods provision will not be benecial.
It seems natural for us to require that any proposed tax system must be
feasible (in terms of the revenue it raises) for any draw, as no player (including
the government) knows the realization of the draw before a tax is imposed. In
other words, the consumers do not transmit information, such as their labor
income, to the government prior to the imposition of the income tax. For
example, an abstract government planner might not know precisely the top
ability of individuals in the economy, and therefore might not be able to follow
optimal income tax rules to give the top ability individual a marginal rate of
2This assumption is similar to the one used in Bierbrauer (2011), though the purpose of
that work is entirely di¤erent from ours.
3As an alternative, the variation in revenue requirements can be seen as variation in scal
pressure on the government; see Heathcote and Tsujiyama (2017) for discussion.
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zero. The key implication of using nite draws as the true economies is that
requiring ex ante feasibility of any proposable tax system for any draw narrows
down the set of alternatives, which we call the feasible set, to a manageable
number (even a singleton in some cases).4
To be clear, the assumption is that the government must commit to a tax
system (as a function of income) before knowing the realization of the draw of
abilities from the distribution of abilities, this tax system cannot depend on
the draw, and it must raise su¢cient draw-dependent revenue no matter the
draw. If we allowed the tax system to depend on the draw of abilities, we
would be back in the situation the rest of the literature has found unsolvable,
since in general any tax system can be defeated by a majority for a given
draw. In other words, if the government doesnt have to commit and can
propose a state or draw contingent tax, we have the same situation as if there
is no uncertainty and a nite number of worker/consumers with given types,
so there generally will be no Condorcet winner in any given state.
Our arguments apply to nite numbers of agents. The model has a dis-
continuity when one goes from a nite to an innite number of agents. In this
latter case there is no uncertainty about the composition of the draw, so we do
not have a continuum of ex ante feasibility restrictions, one for each possible
draw. Instead we have only that the revenue constraint needs to be satised
for the known population. Thus, for our purposes, even a little uncertainty
is su¢cient, and it is possible to view perfect certainty about the draw as a
knife-edge case.5 Moreover, there are further conceptual issues pertaining to
models with a pure public good and a continuum of consumers; see Berliant
and Rothstein (2000).
In relation to the literature that deals with voting over linear taxes, our
model of voting over nonlinear taxes will not yield a linear tax as a solu-
tion without very extreme assumptions. This will be explained in section 6
below. Moreover, our second order condition for incentive compatibility will
generally be much weaker than those used in the literature on linear taxes;
compare our assumptions below with the Hierarchical Adherence assumption
of Roberts (1977). As noted by LOllivier and Rochet (1983), these second
4Pierre Boyer has pointed out that the cost of the public good could be unknown in
addition to or instead of the abilities of the individuals in the economy. This would represent
an aggregate risk to the economy, in contrast with individual abilities, that are idiosyncratic
risks. In accordance with the assumptions concerning asymmetric information in the optimal
tax literature, we stick to unknown individual abilities on the part of the tax designer.
5We are indebted to Jim Snyder for some of these thoughts.
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order conditions are generally not addressed in the optimal income taxation
literature, though they ought to be addressed there. In what follows, we em-
ploy the results contained in Berliant and Gouveia (2001) and more generally
in Berliant and Page (1996) to be sure that the second order conditions for
incentive compatibility hold in our model.
At this point, it is important to remark on the anatomy of our analysis.
We shall introduce two models: an endowment economy, where there is no
choice of labor supply, where each consumer knows only their own endowment
and the prior distribution from which endowments are drawn, and where all
taxes are lump sum; and an optimal income tax economy, where each con-
sumer knows only their own productivity and the prior distribution of types,
where the government knows only the prior distribution from which agents
types are drawn, where taxes induce distortions in labor supply, and where
incentive constraints must be satised. Although results on existence of Con-
dorcet winners for the endowment economy may be of independent interest,
our primary objective is to apply these results to the income tax model with
distortions. The method for accomplishing this is to use a result on imple-
mentation of lump sum taxes from the endowment economy, the rst model, in
terms of a tax on labor income in the optimal income tax economy, the second
model. Under assumptions we shall specify, this result implements the lump
sum tax system in the sense that each consumer facing a labor-leisure choice
ends up paying exactly the tax specied by the lump sum tax system; notice
that income taxes are an indirect mechanism. In the literature on optimal
income taxation, this is called the Taxation Principle. Moreover, we show
that characteristics of the lump sum tax systems, such as single crossing, are
inherited by the taxes implementing them in the framework with incentives.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we introduce our framework
and notation in section 2. In section 3 our main result on voting over both
public goods and income taxes is stated. Section 4 contains a discussion of
the techniques we use in the proofs, whereas section 5 contains two examples
of interest. Finally, section 6 contains conclusions and suggestions for further
research. The appendix contains proofs of most results.
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2 The Model
2.1 Basic Notation and Denitions
We shall develop an initial model of an endowment economy as a tool. Al-
though it might be of independent interest, our primary purpose is to apply
this model and the results we obtain to the standard optimal income tax model
in the succeeding sections.
There is a single consumption good c and consumers preferences are iden-
tical and given by the utility function v(c) = c, with c 2 R+. A con-
sumers endowment, which is also her type, is described by w 2 [w;w], where
[w;w]  R++. In this section the endowment can also be seen as pre-tax
income or, following classical terminology in Public Finance, the ability to pay
of each agent. References to measure are to Lebesgue measure on [w;w].
The distribution of consumers endowments has a measurable density f(w),
where f(w) > 0 a:s:
Let k be a positive integer and let A  [w;w]k, the collection of all possible
draws of k individuals from the distribution with density f .6 Formally, a draw
is an element (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A.
In order to be able to determine what any particular draw can consume, it
is rst necessary to determine what taxes are due from the draw. Hence, we
rst assume that there is a given net revenue requirement function R : A ! R.
For each (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A, R(w1; w2; :::; wk) represents the total taxes due
from a draw. For example, if the revenues from the income tax are used to
nance a good such as schooling, then R(w1; w2; :::; wk) can be seen as: the per
capita revenue requirement for providing schooling to the draw (w1; w2; :::; wk)
multiplied by k.7
Although we shall begin by taking revenue requirements as a primitive, in
6Note that f() plays almost no role in the development to follow, in contrast with its
preeminent role in the standard optimal income tax model. It may be interpreted as a
subjective distribution describing the planner beliefs about the characteristics of the agents
in the economy, but that consideration is immaterial for the model presented here. We have
implicitly assumed that the abilities are drawn independently, but since we never use this,
correlation would also be permissible provided that the support of the joint distribution is
xed at [w;w]k. In multistage voting in a representative democracy, the equilibria are likely
to be a function of f , as is often the case in signaling games. We expect to study that
problem in the future.
7Actually, regarding schooling, there is a separate literature on the political economy of
public supplements for such goods. The formal structure is slightly di¤erent from what we
consider in this paper; see Gouveia (1997).
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the end we will justify this postulate by deriving revenue requirements from
the technology for producing a public good. But this is simply an important
example illustrating where aggregate revenue requirements come from.
It is important to be clear about the interpretation of R. One easy in-
terpretation is that the taxing authority provides a schedule giving the taxes
owed by any draw. There are several reasons that revenue requirements might
di¤er among draws, including di¤erences in taste for a public good that is im-
plicitly provided, income or wealth di¤erences, a non-constant marginal cost
for production of the public good, di¤erences in the cost of revenue collection,
and so forth.
The government and the agents in the economy know the prior distribution
f of types of agents in the economy8 as well as the mapping R. Before moving
on to consider the game - theoretic structure of the problem, it is necessary to
obtain some facts about the set of tax systems that are feasible for any draw
in A. These are the only tax systems that can be proposed, for otherwise
the voters and social planner would know more about the draw than that
it consists of k people drawn from the distribution with density f . Voters
can use their private information (their endowment) when voting, but not in
constructing the feasible set. For otherwise either each voter will vote over a
di¤erent feasible set, or information will be transmitted just in the construction
of the feasible set.
An individual revenue requirement9 is a function g : W ! R that takes w
to tax liability. It is a lump sum tax function.
Clearly, there will generally be a range of individual revenue requirements
consistent with any map R. Our next job is to describe this set formally. Fix
k and R. Let
G 

g : [w;w]! R j g is measurable,
kX
i=1
g(wi)  R(w1; w2; :::; wk) a.s. (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A
)
G is the set of all individual revenue requirements that collect enough
revenue to satisfy R. G 6= ; if almost surely for (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A,
Pk
i=1wi 
R(w1; w2; :::; wk). The constraint that the aggregate revenue requirement be
satised for each draw restricts the feasible set G signicantly.
8Actually, all they need to know is the support of that distribution.
9Even though this is simply a tax function on endowments, we will reserve the terminology
tax function for an environment with incentives to simplify the exposition.
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2.2 FromCollective to Individual Revenue Requirements
In order to examine the set of feasible individual revenue requirements de-
scribed above, more structure needs to be introduced. It is obvious that some
feasible gs will raise strictly more taxes than necessary to meetR(w1; w2; :::; wk)
for almost any (w1; w2; :::; wk). We now search for the minimal elements of the
set G. We call the set of such elements G. In other words, we search for in-
dividual revenue requirements g 2 G  G with the following property: there
is no g
0
such that almost surely for (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A, R(w1; w2; :::; wk) Pk
i=1 g
0
(wi); almost surely for w 2 [w;w], g0(w)  g(w); and there exists a set
of positive Lebesgue measure in [w;w] where g
0
(w) < g(w).
To this end, dene a binary relation  over G by g  g0 if and only if
g(w)  g0(w) for almost all w 2 [w;w]. Let
G  fB  Gj B is a maximal totally ordered subset of Gg:
By Hausdor¤s Maximality Theorem (see Rudin (1974, p. 430)), G 6= ;. Fi-
nally, dene
G  fg : [w;w]! Rj 9B 2 G such that g(w) = inf
g02B
g0(w) a.s.g:
G is nonempty.
If g 2 GnG is proposed as an alternative to g 2 G, 9g0 2 G that is
unanimously weakly preferred to g.
2.3 Notation for the Optimal Income Tax Model
Having dispensed with preliminaries, we now turn to the voting model with
incentives based on Mirrlees (1971). The three goods in the model are a
composite consumption good, whose quantity is denoted by c; labor, whose
quantity is denoted by l; and a pure public good, whose quantity is denoted by
x. Consumers have an endowment of 1 unit of labor/leisure, no consumption
good, and no public good.10 Let u : R+  [0; 1]  R+  [w;w] ! R be the
utility functions of the agents, writing u(c; l; x; w) as the utility function of type
w, where u is twice continuously di¤erentiable. Subscripts represent partial
derivatives of u with respect to the appropriate arguments. The parameter w,
an agents type, is now to be interpreted as the wage rate or productivity of
an agent. Thus w is the value of an agent of type ws endowment of labor.
10It would be easy to add an endowment of consumption good for consumers, but that
would complicate notation.
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The gross income earned by an agent of type w is y = w  l and it equals
consumption when there are no taxes.
A tax system is a function  : R ! R that takes y to tax liability. A
net income function  : R ! R corresponds to a given  by the formula
(y)  y   (y).
First we discuss the typical consumers problem under the premise that the
consumer does not lie about its type, and later turn to incentive problems. A
consumer of type w 2 [w;w] is confronted with the following maximization
problem in this model:
max
c;l
u(c; l; x; w) subject to w  l   (w  l)  c with  ; x given,
and subject to c  0, l  0, l  1.
For xed  , we call arguments that solve this optimization problem c(w)
and l(w) (omitting  and x) as is common in the literature. Dene y(w) 
w  l(w).
The public good nanced by the revenue raised through the income tax is
usually excluded frommodels of optimal income taxation due to the complexity
introduced, but here the cost of the public good will be used to derive the
revenue requirements function. Let the cost function for the public good in
terms of consumption good be H(x), which is assumed to be C2. The basic
set of tax functions for the optimal income tax model is dened as:
T  f : R! Rj  is measurableg
As is standard in the literature, for  2 T we shall generally write (y) to
denote the tax liability of a worker earning income y.
3 Voting Over Income Taxes and a Public Good
3.1 Basic Assumptions
These basic assumptions will be maintained throughout the remainder of this
paper.
We will now use ideas inspired by Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) to obtain
a unique Pareto optimal level of public good for each draw, so the revenue
requirement function is well-dened.
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The major assumption that we make to obtain results, beyond requiring
su¢cient revenue to nance the public good for each draw, is that utility is
quasi-linear and separable to a certain degree:11
u(c; l; x; w) = c+ b(l; w) + r(x;w)
We assume throughout that @b=@l < 0, @2b=@l2 < 0, @r=@x > 0, @2r=@x2 <
0; dH(x)=dx > 0 and d2H(x)=dx2  0.
From this, it follows that utility is strictly monotonic in consumption com-
modity (a good) and labor (a bad). There are several more remarks to
be made. First, if we had more than 1 e¢cient level of public good pos-
sible for given parameters, as is standard in public goods models without the
Bergstrom-Cornes type of assumptions, then we would have another dimension
to vote over, namely the level of the public good. Generally speaking, this
would cause Condorcet cycles and thus no Condorcet winner. Second, if we
made utility more general, for example allowing the subutility function r(x;w)
to depend on consumption good c or labor l or both, then the public good
level and hence the aggregate revenue requirement function would depend on
the tax function, and that tax function would depend on the public good level
and hence the aggregate revenue requirement function. Thus, the aggregate
revenue requirement would not be exogenous and likely not uniquely dened.
Probably it is a solution to a xed point problem, possibly a contraction under
some circumstances. Finally, when production of the public good is not con-
stant returns to scale, there is a potential issue of prot distribution. However,
when utility is quasi-linear, this isnt really an issue.
The bottom line is that something has to be done to shut down the feedback
between tax liabilities and the optimal level of the public good. The Bergstrom
and Cornes (1983) specication is a natural starting point and actually is more
general than some of the separability assumptions used in the optimal nonlinear
income tax literature.
The next step in our analysis is to nd the Pareto e¢cient level of public
goods provision for each draw using the Lindahl-Samuelson condition for our
specialized economy, a technique pioneered by Bergstrom and Cornes (1983).
Let (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A, and let ci and li denote the consumption and
labor supply of the ith member of the draw respectively. Then production
possibilities for this given draw are:
11In this case we are also using w as a taste parameter. That interpretation is quite
common in both the optimal tax literature and the literature on self-selection.
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kX
i=1
wi  li  
kX
i=1
ci  H(x): (1)
Fix (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A. We dene an allocation to be interior if the
associated level of public good x satises x > 0 and H(x) <
kX
i=1
wi.
12 Given
our assumptions, a necessary and su¢cient condition for an interior Pareto
optimum is:
kX
i=1
@r(x;wi)=@x jx=0> dH(x)=dx jx=0 and there is x such that
kX
i=1
@r(x;wi)=@x jx=x< dH(x)=dx jx=x and H(x) <
kX
i=1
wi. More usefully, we
shall assume the following su¢cient condition:
For all w 2 [w;w], @r(x;w)=@x > dH(0)=dx jx=0, and k@r(x;w)=@x jx=H 1(kw)<
dH(x)=dx jx=H 1(kw).
Lemma 1: Under the basic assumptions listed above, for any given draw
(w1; w2; :::wk), there exists an interior Pareto optimal allocation; moreover, for
all interior Pareto optimal allocations, the public good level x is the same.
Proof: The Pareto optimal allocations are solutions to: maxu(c1; l1; x; w1)
subject to u(ci; li; x; wi)  ui for i = 2; 3; :::k and subject to (1) where the
maximum is taken over ci, li, (i = 1; :::; k) and x. Restricting attention to
interior optima, we have the Lindahl-Samuelson condition for this problem:
kX
i=1
@r(x;wi)=@x = dH(x)=dx. (2)
Since this equation is independent of ci and li for all i, the Pareto optimal
level of public good provision is independent of the distribution of income and
consumption for the given draw. Given our assumptions on r and H, there
exists a unique level of public good x that solves (2).
For the class of utility functions dened above we can thus solve for x as
an (implicit) function of (w1; w2; :::; wk), and obtain the revenue requirement
function
R(w1; w2; :::; wk)  H(x(w1; w2; :::; wk)):
12See Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) for an explanation of why we need to restrict the
analysis to interior allocations.
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Let F  T be the feasible set dened by:
F 

 2 T j a.s. for (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A,
kX
i=1
(y(wi))  R(w1; w2; :::; wk)
)
.
Notice that the feasible set does not depend on the level of public good x, since
revenue requirements for Pareto e¢cient x must be satised for all draws, and
hence for the draw that is actually realized.
With this in hand, a straightforward denition of majority rule equilib-
rium follows: a majority rule equilibrium for draws of size k is a correspon-
dence M mapping (w1; w2; :::; wk) into F  R+ such that for almost every
(w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A, for every ( ; x) 2 M(w1; w2; :::; wk) (with associated
y(w)), there is no subset D of fw1; w2; :::; wkg of cardinality greater than k=2
along with another pair ( 0; x0) 2 F  R+ (with associated y0(w)) such that
u(y0(w)    0(y0(w)); y0(w)=w; x0; w) > u(y(w)   (y(w)); y(w)=w; x; w) for all
w 2 D.
It is important to make a couple of remarks about this denition. First,
in the case where aggregate revenue requirements R are taken as primitive
and exogenous, we can simply take the public good level x to be xed. Then
there is no voting over the public good component of the bundle. Second,
when the public good component is not xed, it is important to explain why
we restrict to Pareto optimal provision of the public good for any draw. In
essence, there is unanimity ex post concerning its level. This relies heav-
ily on our assumptions concerning the utility function. To be precise, x a
draw (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A and consider the public good level x(w1; w2; :::; wk).
Below we will nd a   2 F such that ( ; x) is majority undefeated by
any (b ; x) where b 2 F . Suppose that there is a (b ; bx) such that b 2 F ,
kX
i=1
b(by(wi))  H(bx),13 and (b ; bx) majority defeats ( ; x). But since b 2 F ,
kX
i=1
b(by(wi))  H(x(w1; w2; :::; wk)). Hence, if surplus revenue is redistrib-
uted back to consumers under tax system b , or alternatively used for another
public good not made explicit in this model, or simply counted as government
surplus as in cost-benet analysis, (b ; x) Pareto dominates (b ; bx) with ap-
propriate redistribution of the surplus.14 This fact, combined with the fact
13This condition is actually unnecessary.
14This could be uniform per capita redistribution of the surplus, for example.
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that ( ; x) is majority undefeated by any (b ; x) where b 2 F , implies that
( ; x) is not majority defeated by (b ; bx).
We have avoided a technicality here concerning the redistribution of excess
revenue or its other use by the government, both because it adds notation and
because it is unnecessary to restrict its use. What is important to this applica-
tion is that the unique Pareto e¢cient level of public good provision generates
surplus relative to other levels. Of course, in cases where R is a primitive and
there is no public good in the model, this argument is superuous.
3.2 The Main Result
To simplify notation, we shall abbreviate derivatives of functions of only one
variable using primes, e.g. H 0(x)  dH(x)=dx.
Theorem 1: Let k  2 and let u(c; l; x; w) = c + b(l; w) + w  s(br(x)),
H(x) = m  br(x), where br0(x) > 0, br00(x)  0, s0(r) > 0, s00(r) < 0, 2s00(r)2 >
s000(r)  s0(r), m > 0. Then for any draw in A, the one stage voting game over
interior ( ; x) has a majority rule equilibrium.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Examples covered by this theorem include the following:
A. u(c; l; x; w) = c + b(l; w) + w  s(x), H(x) = m  x, where br(x) = x,
s0(x) > 0, s00(x) < 0, s000(x)  0, and m > 0.
B. u(c; l; x; w) = c+ b(l; w) + w
1 x
1 , H(x) = m

 x, with  > 1,   1.
In this case, br(x) = 1

x, s(r) = 
1 

1  r
1 
 .
Example 1 below is covered by B, with  = 3,  = 2.
A complicating factor in proving such theorems is that aggregate revenue
requirements derived here depend not only on the rst derivative of the cost
function, but on its level as well.
4 Discussion of the Underlying Techniques
4.1 Single Crossing Individual Revenue Requirements
With a view toward future extensions of Theorem 1, we state some natural
assumptions on R that will be satised by the revenue requirements derived in
the course of proving Theorem 1. For instance, we might wish simply to take
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revenue requirements R as a primitive rather than derived from a model of a
pure public good. That generalization is covered in this section.
The rst of these assumptions means that position in the draw (rst, sec-
ond, etc.) does not matter. All that matters in determining the revenue to be
extracted from a draw is which types are drawn from the distribution.
Denition: A revenue requirement function R is said to be symmetric
if for each k and for each (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A, for any permutation  of
f1; 2; :::; kg, R(w1; w2; :::; wk) = R(w(1); w(2):::; w(k)).
We will use the assumption that R is C2. This is not a strong assumption,
because the assumption that R is C2 is generic in the appropriate topology;
that is, C2 Rs will uniformly approximate any continuous R (Hirsch (1976,
Theorem 2.2)).15 We will also assume that R is smoothly monotonic:
Denition: A revenue requirement function R is said to be smoothly
monotonic if for any (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A, @R(w1; w2; :::; wk)=@wi > 0 for
i = 1; 2; :::; k.
This assumption requires that increasing the ability or wage of any in-
dividual in a draw increases the total tax liability of the draw. One could
successfully use weaker assumptions with this framework, but at a cost of
greatly complicating the proofs.16
Amajor step in our analysis that we have relegated to other papers that are
cited in the bibliography, Berliant and Gouveia (2001) and Berliant and Page
(1996), is to implement the individual revenue requirement g using an income
tax, an indirect mechanism. A su¢cient (and virtually necessary) condition
is that g be increasing in type, w.17 If g is anywhere decreasing in type, the
net income function can cut the indi¤erence curve of an agent, creating a gap
in the assignment of types to tax liability and ruining the implementation of g
by an income tax. To use the rst order approach to incentive compatibility,
for example, we must make further assumptions, namely the second order
conditions.18 These second order conditions are equivalent to the property
15This idea is also used to justify di¤erentiability in the smooth economies literature.
16One particular case ruled out is the one of constant per capita revenues. In our model
this situation implies constant individual revenue requirements, i.e. a head tax, clearly an
uninteresting situation even though it is rst-best. It also includes the particular situation
where the government wants to raise zero scal revenue. Constant per capita revenues can
be handled as a limit of the cases considered here.
17The case g0(w) = 0 for some types w could be handled, but it creates some technical
problems because g is not necessarily invertible.
18We note that much of the recent literature on optimal taxation veries the second order
conditions ex post, not ex ante; see Kapiµcka (2013) for example.
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that g is increasing.
Turning next to aggregate revenue requirements R, we relate the property
of increasing R (@R(w1; w2; :::; wk)=@wi > 0 for i = 1; 2; :::; k) to increasing g 2
G. Suppose that there are w;w0 2 [w;w] with w0 > w. Then, by denition
of G, there is a draw (w1; w2; :::; wk) with w = wi for some i and
Pk
j=1 g(wj) =
R(w1; w2; :::; wk). Now replace w with w
0, namely set wi = w0, leaving
all other elements of the draw the same. Then R(w1; w2; :::; w
0; :::; wk) >
R(w1; w2; :::; wk). Since g is feasible, g(w1)+g(w2)+   +g(w0)+   +g(wk) 
R(w1; w2; :::; w
0; :::; wk) > R(w1; w2; :::; wk) =
Pk
j=1 g(wj), so g(w
0) > g(w).
The next step is to introduce a set of assumptions where the elements of
the set of feasible and minimal individual revenue requirements G are single
crossing,19 i.e. each pair of gs will cross only once.20 They will be implied by
the postulates of Theorem 1. Thus, future generalizations of our main results
will likely use the lemmas below. The assumptions have collective revenue
requirements decreasing as a draw becomes more polarized.
Denition: A revenue requirement function R(w1; :::wk) is argument-
additive if R(w1; w2; :::; wk)  Q(
kX
i=1
wi). Let Q
0 denote dQ
d
Xk
i=1
wi
.
Lemma 2: Let k  2 and let the revenue requirement functionR(w1; w2; :::; wk)
be argument-additive with Q00 < 0. Then, we have that 8g 2 G, g is as fol-
lows:
 For ew  (w + w)=2, g 2 G implies:
A) g(w; ew) = Q(k ew)=k+Q0(k ew)  (w  ew) if w  ew+(k 1)  ( ew w).
B) g(w; ew) = Q((k 1)w+w)  ((k 1)=k) Q(k ew)+ (k 1) Q0(k ew) 
( ew   w) if w > ew + (k   1)  ( ew   w).
 For ew < (w + w)=2, g 2 G implies:
C) g(w; ew) = Q(k ew)=k+Q0(k ew)  (w  ew) if w  ew  (k 1)  (w  ew)
D) g(w; ew) = Q((k 1)w+w)  ((k 1)=k) Q(k ew)+(k 1) Q0(k ew) 
( ew   w) if w < ew   (k   1)  (w   ew)
19In fact, under stronger assumptions, it is possible to show that the set of feasible and
minimal individual revenue requirements is a singleton, rendering voting trivial. In that
analysis, its useful to have the size of the draw, k, unknown to the planner as well. We
omit this analysis for the sake of brevity.
20A G with single crossing gs generates a trade-o¤ where raising more taxes from one
type of voter allows less revenue to be raised from another type, as in the conventional
income tax model.
17
where ew 2 [w;w]. Thus, dg(w; ew)=dw > 0 except at a nite number of
points. Furthermore, 8w 2 [w;w], g(w; ew) is single caved21 in ew and attains
a minimum at ew = w. Finally, any pair of gs in G will cross once: for
any g; g0 2 G, there exists a ew; ew0 2 [w;w], ew < ew0 such that g(w) > g0(w)
implies g(w) > g0(w) for all w 2 [w; ew), g(w) = g0(w) for all w 2 [ ew; ew0] and
g(w) < g0(w) for all w 2 ( ew0; w].
Proof: See the Appendix.
The implication of our feasibility approach in this case is that feasible tax
functions turn out to be parameterized by ew. The intuition for this result is
quite simple. Consider (for the moment) the case where the distribution of
endowments is not bounded above or below. Since the revenue requirement Q
is concave, so is the per capita revenue requirement Q=k. But then, only the
tangents to Q=k can be tax functions, since any linear combination of taxes has
to be greater than or equal to the per capita requirement. The ews correspond
to the arguments of the per capita revenue functions at the tangency points.
The statement of the theorem is slightly more complex because this intuition
may not work near the bounds w and w.
Note that the marginal rates in branch B are lower than the rates in
branches A and C (the tangent branches), that in turn are lower than those in
branch D. In the argument-additivity case, concavity implies that per-capita
revenue requirements decrease with the polarization of the draw.
Notice that the shape of the distribution of endowments f does not have
in itself any relevant information to predict the shape of the income tax sched-
ules chosen by majority rule, since we have not used it anywhere. Revenue
requirements function R is all that is needed.22
4.2 Single Crossing Optimal Tax Functions
Next, some results from the literature on optimal income taxation and im-
plementation theory are used to construct the best income tax function that
implements a given individual revenue requirement. The discussion will be
informal, but made formal in the theorems and their proofs.
21A function g is single-caved if  g is single peaked.
22With these preliminary results in hand, it would be possible to prove that a majority
rule equilibrium exists for the endowment economy where there is no incentive problem.
Since this not our main aim, for the sake of brevity it is omitted.
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The problem confronting a worker/consumer of type w given net income
schedule  is maxl u((w  l); l; x; w). Using the particular form of utility that
we have specied, the rst order condition from this problem is d
dy
w+@b=@l =
0. Rearranging,
d
dy
=  @b(l; w)
@l
 1
w
.
For this tax schedule, we want the consumer of type w to pay exactly the
taxes due, which are g(w) for some g 2 G. If g is strictly increasing, g is
invertible. If we assume (for the moment) that g(w) is continuously di¤eren-
tiable, then g 1, which maps tax liability to ability (or wage), is well-dened
and continuously di¤erentiable. Substituting into the last expression,
d
dy
=  
@b( y
g 1(y ) ; g
 1(y   ))
@l
 1
g 1(y   )  (; y). (3)
As in Berliant (1992), a standard result from the theory of di¤erential
equations yields a family of solutions to this di¤erential equation.23 Berliant
and Gouveia (2001) show that (3) has global solutions if g0 > 0, g(w)  0.
Of course, as LOllivier and Rochet (1983) point out, the second order
conditions must be checked to ensure that solutions to (3) do not involve
bunching, which means that consumers do optimize in (3) at the tax liability
given by g.24 This was done in Berliant and Gouveia (2001), where the Rev-
elation Principle25 was used to construct strictly increasing post tax income
23The method used above originates with the signaling model in Spence (1974), further
developed by Riley (1979) and Mailath (1987). Equation (3) is best seen as dening an indi-
rect mechanism where gross income is the signal sent by each agent to the planner, much as
in Spences model education is the signal sent to the rm. However, nding the equilibria of
this game is only part of the problem. The remaining part of the problem relates to imple-
mentation. By this we mean that the social planners problem is to dene reward/penalty
functions that induce each type of agent to choose, in equilibrium, the behavior the planner
desires of that type of agent. A reference closer to our work is Guesnerie and La¤ont (1984).
However, there is a di¤erence between our results and the other literature on implementa-
tion using the di¤erentiable approach to the revelation principle. The di¤erence is that in
the other literature the principal cares only about implementing the action proles of the
agents (labor supply schedules in our model). In contrast, we consider the implementation
of explicit maps from types to tax liability. That is, the principal cares about agents types,
which are hidden knowledge. These maps from types to tax liability are not action proles,
and are motivated by the ability to pay approach in classical public nance. They play the
same role here as reduced form auctions play in the auction literature.
24That is, we have a separating equilibrium.
25In (3) the planner rst chooses a net income function (y), the agents then take the
chosen net income function as given and maximize utility by selecting a gross income level y
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functions (w) = y(w)   g(w) that implement g(w), where g0(w) > 0. Since
we then have that y(w) is invertible, we immediately obtain (y) = (w(y))
and (y) = g(w(y)).
It is almost immediate from this development that the set of solutions to
(3) for a given g is Pareto ranked. We focus on the best of these for each given
g. Dene
T   f 2 T j  is a solution to (3) for some g 2 G, (y) = y   (y),
and  Pareto dominates all other solutions to (3) for the given gg .
Any element of T  has the property that the marginal tax rate for the top
ability w consumer type is zero.
From a practical viewpoint, for instance in solving examples such as those
presented here, the use of these techniques and in particular equation (3)
makes sense. However, for the general theory, in our application we do not
have the conditions required by Berliant and Gouveia (2001); for example, the
standard boundary condition is not satised due to the quasi-linear form of
utility. Thus, we use Berliant and Page (1996), which is more general than
Berliant and Gouveia (2001), and even then we must modify the proof slightly.
Lemma 3: If G is a set of measurable functions that are non-decreasing,
then for any k and any  2 T there is a   2 T  such that the utility level of
each agent under   is at least as large as the utility level of each agent under
 and such that the marginal tax rate for the top ability w consumer type
under  , if it exists, is zero.26
Proof: We verify the assumptions of Berliant and Page (1996), Theorems
1 and 2, with a modication. Obviously, u is continuous and strictly decreas-
ing in tax payment  , where c = y   . As is standard in the optimal income
tax literature, single crossing is satised because c is a normal good. The mod-
ication we must make is that, instead of the boundary conditions (3) and (4)
(or the corresponding level of labor supply). This is the implementation approach described
in La¤ont (1988). The Revelation Principle allows us to write an equivalent mechanism
where agents are simply asked to report their type w. It is easier to check second order
conditions of the problem for this direct mechanism. They essentially say that both pre and
post tax incomes should be increasing functions of w. In our case they are strictly increasing
functions and there is no bunching.
26The result on the top marginal tax rate is extended to non-di¤erentiable functions in
Berliant and Page (1996), but is a little complicated and, in fact, irrelevant to our purpose
here.
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in that paper, we have quasi-linear utility. The boundary conditions are used
in only one place in the proofs, namely in the rst paragraph of the proof of
Theorem 1 of that paper. So we provide a substitute for the argument in that
paragraph; quasi-linear utility actually makes the proof simpler. As there,
Y = [0;m)  R+, the set of all possible incomes. We can set m > w. First,
given income yi assigned to person i in the draw, where people are ordered
by income from lowest to highest, omit x since it is irrelevant to this argu-
ment. The proof is by induction downward, beginning with the highest type
k. After the inductive argument, Berliant and Page (1996, p. 399) let k !1.
Let yk 2
n
y 2 Y j u(y   g(wk); ywk ; wk)  u(y0   g(wk);
y0
wk
; wk)8y0 2 Y
o
. De-
ne (y) = g(wk) for y 2 [yk;1). We must show that there is byi 1 such
that u(byi 1   g(wi 1); byi 1wi 1 ; wi 1)  u(yi   g(wi); yiwi 1 ; wi 1). Taking byi 1 =
yi   g(wi) + g(wi 1)  yi and evaluating the utility di¤erence for our specic
form of utility function, u(byi 1 g(wi 1); byi 1wi 1 ; wi 1) u(yi g(wi); yiwi 1 ; wi 1) =
yi   g(wi) + g(wi 1)   g(wi 1) + b( byi 1wi 1 ; wi 1)   yi + g(wi)   b(
yi
wi 1
; wi 1) =
b( byi 1
wi 1
; wi 1)   b( yiwi 1 ; wi 1)  0. As in the proof, since g(wi 1)  g(wi),
u(yi   g(wi); yiwi 1 ; wi 1)  u(yi   g(wi 1);
yi
wi 1
; wi 1), and hence u(byi 1  
g(wi 1);
byi 1
wi 1
; wi 1)  u(yi   g(wi); yiwi 1 ; wi 1)  u(yi   g(wi 1);
yi
wi 1
; wi 1).
So there exists yi 1 2 [byi 1; yi] with u(yi 1   g(wi 1); yi 1wi 1 ; wi 1) = u(yi  
g(wi);
yi
wi 1
; wi 1). Then for y 2 (yi 1; yi) dene (y)  y + b( ywi 1 ; wi 1)  
yi 1 + g(wi 1)   b( yi 1wi 1 ; wi 1). For i = 1, for y 2 [0; y1), dene (y) 
y + b( y
w1
; w1)   y1 + g(w1)   b( y1w1 ; w1). The remainder of the proofs proceed
as in that paper.
Remark: The theorem says that any non-negative and feasible revenue
requirement function can be implemented by a continuum of tax schedules.
These tax schedules are Pareto ranked and furthermore a maximal tax schedule
under the Pareto ranking exists.
The next step is to characterize a class of individual revenue requirements
for which we will be able to obtain results. This class contains the cases
discussed in Theorem 1 and may possibly include other sets of assumptions.
Denition: A collection E of functions mapping [w;w] into R is called
strongly single crossing if each g 2 E is:
1. Continuous.
2. Twice continuously di¤erentiable except possibly at a nite number of
points.
21
3. dg=dw > 0 except possibly at a nite number of points.
4. Individual revenue requirements cross each other only once, i.e. for any
pair g; g0 2 E, there exists a ew; ew0 2 [w;w], ew < ew0 such that g(w) >
g0(w) implies g(w) > g0(w) for all w 2 [w; ew), g(w) = g0(w) for all
w 2 [ ew; ew0] and g(w) < g0(w) for all w 2 ( ew0; w].
The next two lemmata do not rely on the assumption that utility is quasi-
linear. Lemma 4 proves that when individual revenue requirements are
strongly single crossing, the income tax systems in T  cross at most once.
Lemma 4: Let k be a positive integer. Suppose that R implies strongly
single crossing minimal individual revenue requirements, G. Let  ;  0 2
T , and let y(); y0() be the gross income functions associated with  and  0,
respectively. For incomes y1; y2; y3 2 y([w;w]) \ y0([w;w]), y1 < y2 < y3,
(y3) < 
0(y3) and (y2) >  0(y2) implies (y1)   0(y1).27
Proof: See the Appendix.
The notion of strongly single crossing of tax systems is the analog of con-
dition (SC) of Gans and Smart (1996) in this specic context.
Lemmas 3 and 4 are used to prove Lemma 5:
Lemma 5: Let k be a positive integer. Suppose that R implies strongly
single crossing minimal individual revenue requirements, G. Then for any
draw in A, the one stage voting game has a majority rule equilibrium, namely
8(w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A, M(w1; w2; :::; wk) 6= ;.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Strongly single crossing is used intensively to prove this. It has the im-
plication that induced preferences over tax systems have properties shared by
single peaked preferences over a one dimensional domain. The winners will be
the tax systems most preferred by the median voter (in the draw) out of tax
systems in T .
The proof consists of two parts. The rst part shows that there is a tax
schedule that is weakly preferred to all others by the median voter. The second
part shows that this tax schedule is a majority rule winner. This second part
could be replaced by Gans and Smart (1996, Theorem 1). But it would take
27Outside of y([w;w]),  can be extended in an arbitrary fashion subject to incentive
compatibility, for example in a linear way.
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as much space to verify the assumptions of that Corollary as it does to prove
our more specialized result directly.
5 Examples
Next we provide a pair of simple examples that can be solved.
Example 1: Take
u(c; l; x; w) = c  l
2
2
  w  x
 2
2
H(x) =
x2
2
The marginal cost of the public good is x. The marginal willingness to pay
of type w for the public good is w  x 3, so the total marginal willingness to
pay for the draw (w1; w2; :::; wk) is x
 3
kX
i=1
wi. Setting this equal to marginal
cost to solve for the Pareto e¢cient level of public good provision (that will
be unique), we obtain:
x(w1; w2; :::; wk) =
 
kX
i=1
wi
! 1
4
A reason why the isoelastic case might be interesting comes from the fact that
it is a suitable case for the purpose of carrying out empirical tests of the model,
given that the correct way to aggregate abilities (or tastes) in this particular
case is simply to sum them.
The aggregate revenue requirement function is:
R(w1; w2; :::; wk) = H (x
(w1; w2; :::; wk)) =
1
2
vuut kX
i=1
wi
Next, take w = 1, w = 2, and let ew be the median type of a draw. Then
as in Lemma 2, if k  2 and 1:5  ew  2, the minimal individual revenue
requirements are indexed by ew and given by28
g(w; ew) = 1
2
(k ew) 12 =k + 1
4
(k ew)  12  (w   ew)
=
1
4
"r ew
k
+
r
1
k ew  w
#
28To keep calculations simple, we focus on draws where the median is at least 1:5.
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In an endowment economy, this is the tax on endowments most preferred by
type ew among those satisfying the aggregate revenue constraints. In this
particular case, it is a linear tax. The next step is to implement it in an
optimal income tax economy.
Applying the rst order approach to incentive compatibility29 given in the
di¤erential equation (3) above, d
dy
= 1   d
dy
, and g 1(y   ) = w, the income
tax function is given by the solution to:30
d
dy
= 1  y
w2
Inverting g and solving for w in terms of  ,
w = 4
p
k ew   ew
so
d
dy
= 1  yh
4
p
k ew   ewi2
This ordinary di¤erential equation has a solution at through every point. To
choose the best of these, take the one that has the marginal tax rate zero for the
top type w = 2. For the top type, it is the solution that goes through ( ; y) =
1
2
p
k ew +
1
4
q ew
k
;
h
2+ ewp
k ew   ewi2

. This will be the majority rule equilibrium for
any draw with median ew  1:5. A comparative static can be derived in this
example: The marginal tax rate at any income is increasing in the size of the
economy (k).
Example 2: One point of this example is that although we will restrict to
quasi-linear utility functions for the general theory, that might not be neces-
sary. Take
u(c; l; x; w) = min (c; w  [1  l])  w  x
 2
2
H(x) =
x2
2
The aggregate revenue requirements function is unchanged from Example 1.
Setting c = w  [1  l],
y    = w   y
29The second order condition for incentive compatibility will be satsied because @g(w; ew)
@w
>
0.
30Although we know that a solution exists and through any point it is unique, actually
solving the ODE explicitly is another matter entirely.
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Therefore,
(y) = 2y   w
= 2y   4
p
k ew(y) + ew
and thus
(y) =
2y + ew
1 + 4
p
k ew
Comparative statics in k and ew are apparent.
Remarks: The single crossing of individual revenue requirements results
from the combination of: the assumptions on utility and cost of the public good,
and the idea that the aggregate revenue requirements must be satised for any
draw. We proved in Lemma 4 that when we implement the individual revenue
requirements and impose second best e¢ciency, the single crossing property is
inherited by the income tax implementations. One common feature of our in-
dividual revenue requirement functions is that there is a switch point, indexed
by ew in our examples here, that represents the individual revenue requirement
that minimizes that types tax liability among all individual revenue require-
ments satisfying the aggregate revenue requirements for all draws. This is not
actually necessary for our general results, and is not used in the proofs once
we obtain single crossing of individual revenue requirements. However, as
seen from Example 1, provided that g is strictly increasing, the optimization
point for type w under the (optimal) income tax framework will correspond
to tax liability g(w; ew). Therefore, using the standard diagrams from opti-
mal tax theory,31 the majority rule equilibrium will correspond to the best
implementation (solution to the ordinary di¤erential equation) of the revenue
requirement function that minimizes the tax liability of the median type of
the draw, g(w; ew). Thus, the switch point is inherited by the optimal income
tax implementation of the individual revenue requirements. The fact that we
do not use the switch point once we have single crossing of individual revenue
requirements allows room for expansion of our results.
6 Conclusions
Two di¤erent but related issues deserve some discussion at the outset. The rst
is whether information on the likelihood of each draw can be used. The second
is how to deal with possible excess revenues. As for the opposite situation of
31See Seade (1977).
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insu¢cient revenues, the reader should note that imposing a penalty for not
meeting the requirement simply results in a new revenue requirement function.
We rst discuss the information issue. One obvious possibility would be
to dene as feasible all individual revenue requirement functions that generate
an expected revenue equal to or larger than the expected collective revenue
requirement. In contrast with what we use, this would be a single constraint
rather than a constraint for each draw. The problem with this notion is that
single crossing conditions for individual revenue requirements would likely fail
to be satised for most cases including the ones studied in this paper. But
one could consider weakening our feasibility restriction and still have enough
bite to generate single crossing gs. Here is a suggestion:
One option is to use a class of probability measures over draws and constrain
the expectation of revenues for each probability measure. Expected revenue
according to f would be one particular member of this class. The class could
be chosen to generate a continuum of constraints, binding enough for the single
crossing result to survive, and we would be back to our initial setup although
with di¤erent feasibility conditions. This is similar to a model of government
behavior using ambiguity aversion or Knightian uncertainty. Perhaps this
could be justied as a way to aggregate risk averse voter preferences over
budget decits.
We now address the issue of excess revenue. Consider rst the case of utility
quasi-linear in consumption good that we have used throughout this paper. It
is possible to return the ex post excess revenue in a lump-sum fashion, as there
are no income e¤ects. Or the government could use them for another purpose,
such as production of yet another public good.
When we consider general preferences and technologies the problem be-
comes more di¢cult. Clearly, the excess revenue cannot be returned to tax-
payers in a lump sum fashion, as it will a¤ect their behavior in optimizing
against the income tax. However, once we deviate from quasi-linear utility,
other issues would arise before we get to this point, most importantly the
presence of multiple Pareto optimal levels of public good provision. From the
point of view of applications, analysis of these more general models will be
much more di¢cult.
Since our income tax is distortive, it is reasonable to inquire why we should
impose the Pareto e¢cient level of public goods provision for each draw. To
be specic, a second-best, lower level of public good provision could be used,
where the amount of revenue that must be collected, and thus the distortion
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imposed by the income tax, could be reduced. For example, a draw of all
high types will require a high level of public good provision and thus high per
capita taxes. To ensure that high types do not try to mimic low types, the per
capita tax on low types will generally have to be higher than it would be if the
draw were known to consist of all low types and the rst best level of public
good provision for that draw is used. Thus, excess revenue will be generated
from some draws, specically of all low types, and it might be more e¢cient
to reduce the income tax for all draws and types and provide a second best,
lower level of public good and consequent lower tax for each draw.32 The
problem with this argument is that, ex post, after labor is supplied and taxes
are collected, the workers would like to voluntarily contribute lump sum to
raise the level of public good back to rst best, say through a constant per
capita tax. In other words, they would like to renegotiate. So we stick to
rst best public good levels to avoid this problem.
This example also illustrates how the incentive constraints a¤ect the feasi-
ble set of tax instruments. What we have presented here is a benchmark, in
that the rst best public good level is unique for each draw, thus cutting o¤
feedback between public good level and income tax selection. Such feedback
would make our analysis much more di¢cult.
The bottom line is whether the alternative models have more to o¤er. Is
it better to restrict ourselves to xed revenue and voting over a parameter of
a prespecied functional form for taxes (as in the previous literature), which
are also generally Pareto dominated, or is the model proposed here a useful
complement? Di¤erences of opinion are clearly possible.
We note here that unlike much of the earlier literature on voting over linear
taxes, the majority equilibria are not likely to be linear taxes without strong
assumptions on utility functions and on the structure of incentives. The reason
is simple: in the optimal income tax model, Pareto optimality requires that
the top ability individuals face a marginal tax rate of zero.33 All majority
rule equilibria derived in this paper are second best Pareto optimal (for a given
individual revenue requirement), and hence satisfy this property. Therefore,
32These interesting comments belong to Paolo Piacquadio.
33We know of only one case where an optimal tax is linear: Snyder and Kramer (1988).
But this and other results derived in that paper are due to the use of a peculiar model that
departs signicantly from the other models used in the study of income taxation. There
are no income nor substitution e¤ects on e¤ort induced by taxation up to the point where
workers switch to the underground sector, and from that point on the same holds since, by
denition, income realized in the underground sector is not taxed.
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poll taxes are the only linear taxes that could possibly be equilibria. In our
model, such taxes are not generally majority rule equilibria, since consumers
at the lower ability end of the spectrum will object.
In that sense, the results obtained here are a step forward relative to Romer
(1975) and Roberts (1977). In another sense, they also improve on Snyder and
Kramer (1988) by using a standard optimal income tax model as the framework
to obtain the results.
There are a few strategies that may be productive in pursuing research
on voting over taxes. One strategy is to use probabilistic voting models such
as in Ledyard (1984). Another is to take advantage of the structure built in
this paper and, with our results in hand, look at multi-stage games in which
players actions at the earlier stages might transmit information about types.
Of course, it might be necessary to look at renements of the Nash equilibrium
concept to narrow down the set of equilibria to those that are reasonable (at
least imposing subgame perfection as a criterion).
A two-stage game of interest is one in which k is xed and each player in
a draw proposes a tax system in T  (simultaneously). The second stage of the
game proceeds as in the single stage game above, with voting restricted to only
those tax systems in T  that were proposed in the rst stage.
A three stage game of interest is one in which k is again xed and the
players in a draw elect representatives and who then propose tax systems and
proceed as in the two stage game (see Baron and Ferejohn (1989)).
Work remains to be done in obtaining comparative statics results, as in
the examples. Finally, the predictive power of the model will be the subject
of empirical research. That will certainly be the focus of future work.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
For a draw (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A, the Lindahl-Samuelson condition for this
model is:
kX
i=1
wi  s0(br(x))  br0(x) = m  br0(x)
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Hence,
x = br 1
2666664s0 1
0BBBBB@
m
kX
i=1
wi
1CCCCCA
3777775
and thus
R(w1; w2; :::; wk) = m  s0 1
0BBBBB@
m
kX
i=1
wi
1CCCCCA
Hence, R is argument additive. Computing the rst derivative,
dR
d
kX
i=1
wi
=  m2  1
s00
0BBB@s0 1
0BBB@ mkX
i=1
wi
1CCCA
1CCCA 
 
kX
i=1
wi
!2 > 0
Computing the second derivative,
d2R
d
 
kX
i=1
wi
!2
= m2 
2s00
0BBB@s0 1
0BBB@ mkX
i=1
wi
1CCCA
1CCCA 
 
kX
i=1
wi
!
+ s000
0BBB@s0 1
0BBB@ mkX
i=1
wi
1CCCA
1CCCA   m
s00
0
BBBBBBB@
s0 1
0
BBBBBBB@
m
kX
i=1
wi
1
CCCCCCCA
1
CCCCCCCA26664s00
0BBB@s0 1
0BBB@ mkX
i=1
wi
1CCCA
1CCCA 
 
kX
i=1
wi
!237775
2
= m2 
2s00 (r) 
 
kX
i=1
wi
!
+ s000 (r)   m
s00(r)24s00 (r)  kX
i=1
wi
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where
r = s0 1
0BBBBB@
m
kX
i=1
wi
1CCCCCA
Thus,
d2R
d
 
kX
i=1
wi
!2 < 0 if and only if
2s00 (r) 
 
kX
i=1
wi
!
< s000 (r)  m
s00 (r)
or
2s00 (r)2 > s000 (r)  s0(r)
The last expression holds by assumption. Therefore, R is argument additive
with negative second derivative. The result then follows from Lemmas 2 and
5.
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
It is straightforward to prove by direct calculation that 8g(w; ew) 2 G as given
in the statement of the Lemma, g(w; ew) is continuously di¤erentiable in each
of w and ew and is strictly increasing in w. Since R is argument-additive,
R(w1; w2; :::; wk) = Q(
kX
i=1
wi) = Q(k  wA), where wA is the average ability in
the draw.
Next focus on branches A and C of the statement of the Lemma. Since R
is concave, on these branches,
g(w; ew) = Q(k  ew)=k +Q0(k  ew)(wA   ew)  Q( kX
i=1
wi)=k.
This shows that the branches A and C in the statement of the Lemma are
feasible. We now prove that they are minimal. Consider branch A. Clearly,
if a draw consists of k individuals of type ew, g( ew; ew) is minimal. To show
that g(w; ew) is minimal, suppose the opposite. Take h(w) to be minimal,
with h( ew) = Q(k  ew)=k and h(w)  g(w; ew) with strict inequality for some
w1 2 [w; ew + (k   1)  ( ew   w)]. It is feasible to have a draw (w1; w2; :::wk)
with mean ew and wi 2 [w; ew + (k   1)  ( ew   w)] for i = 1; 2; :::k. Then,
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R(w1; w2; :::wk) = Q(k  ew) = kX
i=1
g(wi; ew). But kX
i=1
h(wi) <
kX
i=1
g(wi; ew), so
h(w) is not feasible. Similar reasoning holds for branch C.
Now consider branch B and w1 2 ( ew + (k   1)( ew   w); w]. The logic used
for branches A and C does not hold in this case: it is not possible to nd k 1
ability levels in order to construct a draw with mean ew. Consider a draw with
wj 2 [w; ew + (k   1)  ( ew   w)] for j = 2; 3; :::k. Due to argument-additivity,
for any xed draw mean wA, we can take all wjs (j = 2; 3; :::; k) to be equal
to bw = (k  wA   w1)=(k   1), without loss of generality. Feasibility requires
g(w1; ew) + (k   1)  g( bw; ew)  Q((k   1)  bw + w1).
Take this as an equality and replace g( bw; ew) by
Q(k  ew)=k +Q0(k  ew)  ( bw   ew)
to obtain:
g(w1; ew) = Q((k 1) bw+w1) (k 1)=kQ(k ew) (k 1)Q0(k ew)( bw  ew) (4)
By construction, this revenue requirement is minimal (particularly at bw = ew).
Next, notice that
(k   1)  bw + w1 > (k   1)  bw + ew + (k   1)  ( ew   w)
 (k   1)  w + ew + (k   1)  ( ew   w) = k  ew
Since Q is concave,
(k   1) Q0((k   1)  bw + w1) < (k   1) Q0(k  ew)
Hence, expression (4) is maximized over bw 2 [w;w] at bw = w, so feasibility
requires
g(w1; ew) = Q((k 1) w+w1)  (k 1)=k Q(k  ew)+(k 1) Q0(k  ew)  ( ew w).
It is easy to prove that allowing for draws with di¤erent compositions, namely
more than one ability in the interval [ ew+(k  1)  ( ew w); w], does not violate
feasibility. We thus obtain branch B in the statement of the Lemma. Branch
D is obtained following similar reasoning.
Next, suppose there is h 2 G that is not of the form given in the statement
of the Lemma. Then there is some w 2 [w;w] with h(w) < g(w). Then
k  h(w) < k  g(w;w) = Q(k  w), implying that h is not feasible.
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To prove single cavedness in ew, one need only di¤erentiate g(w; ew) with
respect to the parameter ew. For branches A and C we obtain:
@g(w; ew)
@ ew = Q00(k  ew)  k  (w   ew).
The derivative above is positive if w < ew and negative for w > ew.
For branch B we have:
@g(w; ew)
@ ew = k  (k   1) Q00(k  ew)  ( ew   w) < 0.
which applies only for w > ew.
Finally, for branch D we get:
@g(w; ew)
@ ew = k  (k   1) Q00(k  ew)  ( ew   w) > 0.
which applies only for w < ew.
These results imply that argmin ew g(w; ew) = w. Furthermore, we claim
that these gs are single crossing. To see this, rst note that from the denition
of g(w; ew) in the statement of the Lemma, direct calculation yields that @g(w; ew)
@w
is weakly decreasing in ew for each w. Therefore, if g(w; ew) and g(w; ew0) cross
twice, there exist w;w0; w00 2 [w;w], w < w0 < w00 such that g(w; ew) = g(w; ew0),
g(w0; ew) 6= g(w0; ew0), g(w00; ew) = g(w00; ew0). But this cannot happen in each
case: ew0 = ew, ew0 < ew, ew0 > ew.
7.3 Proof of Lemma 434
Let g and g0 be the elements of G associated with  and  0, respectively. The
proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there exist incomes y1 < y2 < y3 with
(y1) < 
0(y1), (y2) >  0(y2) and (y3) <  0(y3). Then by the intermediate
value theorem applied to utility di¤erences as a function of w, there exists wa
such that u(y(wa)  (y(wa)); y(wa)=wa) = u(y0(wa)   0(y0(wa)); y0(wa)=wa),
y0(wa) > y(wa),  0(y0(wa)) < (y0(wa)) and (y(wa)) <  0(y(wa)). Moreover,
g(wa) = (y(wa)) <  0(y(wa)) and since y0(wa) > y(wa), g0(wa) > g(wa).35
There also exists wb > wa with u(y(wb)   (y(wb)); y(wb)=wb) = u(y0(wb)  
 0(y0(wb)); y0(wb)=wb), y(wb) > y0(wb), (y0(wb)) >  0(y0(wb)) and  0(y(wb)) >
(y(wb)). Hence (y0(wb)) >  0(y0(wb)) = g0(wb) and since y(wb) > y0(wb),
g(wb) > g0(wb).
34To see how this critical proof works, it is useful to draw the graphs from optimal taxation,
net income as a function of gross income, that are standard in the literature; see Seade (1977).
35d=dy = dg=dw  dw=dy > 0 holds because dg=dw > 0 and dw=dy > 0 is proved in
Proposition 1 of Berliant and Gouveia (2001).
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Using strongly single crossing, g(w) > g0(w).
By construction of T , (y(w)) >  0(y0(w)). Note that since the mar-
ginal tax rate at y(w) and y0(w) is zero, what we have are essentially lump
sum taxes at the top ability level. Hence, u(y0(w)    0(y0(w)); y0(w)=w) >
u(y(w) (y(w)); y(w)=w). Normality of leisure implies y(w) > y0(w). More-
over, continuity of  implies (y0(w)) >  0(y0(w)) Since  0(y(wb)) > (y(wb)),
there exists y0(w) > y > y(wb) with (y) =  0(y), so there exists wc with
u(y(wc)   (y(wc)); y(wc)=wc) = u(y0(wc)    0(y0(wc)), y0(wc)=wc), y0(wc) >
y(wc),  0(y0(wc)) < (y0(wc)) and (y(wc)) <  0(y(wc)). As above, g(wc) <
 0(y(wc)) and since y0(wc) > y(wc), g0(wc) > g(wc).
This contradicts strongly single crossing. So the hypothesis is false, and
the lemma is established.
7.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Denition: Let C1 be the space of continuously di¤erentiable functions (with
domain [w;w] and range R) endowed with the uniform topology. We consider
T  to be a subset of this space by extending any  2 T  to the whole domain,
if necessary, in a C1 and linear fashion.
Fix  2 T . First we claim that 0  d=dy  1. The rst inequality
holds because d=dy = dg=dw  dw=dy, and dg=dw > 0 (except possibly at a
nite number of points) by assumption whereas dw=dy  0 is demonstrated in
the course of proving the implementation result, Proposition 1, in Berliant and
Gouveia (2001), so it holds except possibly at a nite number of points. Since,
in spite of the exceptions at nitely many points,  will be C1, 0  d=dy. The
second inequality can be written d=dy  0, which reduces to d=dw dw=dy 
0. As before, dw=dy  0, and d=dw  0 is demonstrated in the same place as
dw=dy  0. (Note that d=dw > 0 is the second order condition for incentive
compatibility in this model.) So every  2 T  is Lipschitz in income with
constant 1, and thus T  is equicontinuous. Since k g(w)  R(w;w; :::; w)  0,
T  is also norm bounded by w. Using Ascolis theorem (see Munkres (1975, p.
290)), T

(the closure of T  in C1) is compact.
Fix k and let (w1; w2; :::; wk) 2 A. For any  2 T , let v( ; w) = maxy u(y 
(y); y=w), the utility induced by the tax system  for type w. It is easy to
verify that for each w, v( ; w) is continuous in its rst argument.
Let   be a maximal element of T

using v(; wM) as the objective, where
wM is the median ability level in (w1; w2; :::; wk) if k is odd, and w
M 2
33
[wk=2; wk=2+1] (where the wage rates are ordered in an increasing fashion) if
k is even. Using Lemma 3,   2 T .
Now suppose there exists  2 T such that there is a subsetD of fw1; w2; :::; wkg
with v( ; w) > v( ; w) for all w 2 D and where the cardinality of D is greater
than k=2. Then using Lemma 3, we can take  to be in T  without loss of
generality. Using Lemma 4,  and  are single crossing, or alternatively, their
after tax income functions are single crossing. Thus, there exist intervals
W;W 0  [w;w] such that W and W 0 partition [w;w] and D  W . Let W
be the smallest interval (in the sense of set inclusion) such that W and its
complement are both intervals, W and W 0 partition [w;w], and D  W .
Then by denition of  , wM =2 W . Hence D cannot contain a majority
of the draw, a contradiction. Hence the hypothesis is false and   cannot be
defeated by any other feasible tax system.
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